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PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF "UNCONSTITULAWS:
REVIVING
THE
ROYAL
TIONAL"
1
PREROGATIVE. Christopher N. May. Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press. 1998. Pp. xiv, 215. Cloth, $59.95.
2

J. Randy Beck

No President should lightly disregard an Act of Congress.
The Constitution, which vests authority in the President, also directs him to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. "3
Pragmatic considerations reinforce the constitutional duty. Perceived disobedience to a statutory command carries significant
legal and political risks, a point illustrated by Andrew Johnson's
impeachment on the charge that he violated the Tenure of Office Act. 4
But does the Constitution require the President to honor
legislation he reasonably believes to violate the Constitution?5 Is
enforcement of an unconstitutional statute consistent with the
President's oath to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States"?6 "Yes," answers Professor Christopher N. May to both questions in Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative.
Presidential Defiance contributes to an ongoing debate over
the legitimacy of a practice that Judge Frank Easterbrook has
termed "presidential review"- the asserted power of the President to refrain from executing a statute deemed to overstep conI. James P. Bradley Professor of Constitutional Law, Loyola University, Los An·
geles.
2. Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. I would like to thank
Michael Stokes Paulsen and especially my colleague Dan T. Coenen for many helpful
comments on this book review.
3. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 3.
4. William H. Rehnquist, Grand Inquests: The Historic Impeachments of Justice
Samuel Chase and President Andrew Johnson 226-27 (William Morrow and Co., 1992).
By one vote, the Senate failed to convict Johnson in the impeachment trial. Id. at 234-35;
John F. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage 139-40 (Harper & Row,1961).
5. Andrew Johnson's defense in the impeachment trial rested in part on the claim
that the Tenure of Office Act was unconstitutional. (pp. 59-60) The Supreme Court
later agreed with Johnson's position that the statute was unconstitutional. Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) ("the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far as it
attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid").
6. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 1, cl. 8.
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stitutional boundaries. 7 Updating an article first published in the
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly,8 May has produced a useful piece of scholarship, likely to be cited in future legal tests of
the presidential review power. Particularly helpful is May's
compilation of 145 instances between 1789 and 1981 in which
presidents questioned the constitutionality of a statute, and his
investigation of the outcome of each incident. (pp. 53-139)
May argues that the Founders intended the President to implement Acts of Congress, notwithstanding constitutional scruples. The asserted presidential review power was not exercised
until long after the founding, May contends, and is foreign to the
Framers' world view, which was shaped by the history of relations between the English Crown and Parliament. Only reluctantly does May posit a potentially justifiable use of the presidential review power, in cases where presidential "defiance" is
the only means of bringing a statute's constitutional defects to
the attention of the courts. (pp. 143-49)
Notwithstanding the valuable contribution made by May's
historical research, this reader remains unpersuaded. 9 May convincingly maintains that the Framers denied the President any
general power to dispense with the execution of properlyenacted laws-a power arguably asserted by the Nixon administration, for instance, when it claimed constitutional authority to
"impound" funds appropriated by Congress. 10 May's argument
loses steam, however, when applied to a President's good faith
refusal to implement a statute on constitutional grounds. I will
begin with a brief recitation of one argument for presidential review and then consider some of May's principal counterarguments.

7.

Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905 (1989-

90).
8. Christopher N. May, Presidential Dejimu:e of 'Unconstitutional' Laws: Reviving
the Royal Prerogative, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 865 (1994).
9. I should admit the potential for bias on my part, which arises from a nine-month
stint with the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC). OLC deals frequently with questions of presidential power and has provided much of the legal advice
underlying recent claims that the President may refuse to enforce unconstitutional statutes. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Legal Opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel to
the Honorable Abner J. Mikva (Nov. 2, 1994) (reprinted in 48 Ark. L. Rev. 313 (1995)).
Having been steeped in the outlook and culture of OLC at an impressionable age, I may
find the theory of presidential review more inherently plausible than other readers.
10. Note, Jmpourulrnent of Funds, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1505,1512-16 (1973).
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I

The theory of presidential review bears a strong family resemblance to judicial review, its doctrinal sibling. Consequently,
one standard argument for presidential review tracks the justification for judicial review offered in Marbury v. Madison. 11 Chief
Justice Marshall, in the final pages of his Marbury opinion, considers the sources of "law" a court may consult in resolving particular cases or controversies. A court may, of course, look to
acts of the legislature that appear to govern the dispute. But
does the Constitution also supply "law" applicable in judicial
proceedings?
Marshall concludes that the Constitution represents "paramount law." 12 The Constitution is an act of the sovereign people,
by which the powers of the legislature are defmed and limited.
Principles expressed in the document are therefore fundamental.13 In case of a conflict between a statute and the Constitution,
the latter necessarily prevails. "[A)n act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void." 4
Just as the courts must determine the applicable "law" in
fulfilling their judicial functions, the President must undertake a
parallel inquiry to perform his executive duties. The Constitution requires the President to "take Care that the Laws be faith15
fully executed." But which "laws" come within the President's
constitutional duty of faithful execution? If we adhere to the
reasoning of Marbury, then the Constitution itself contains
"law" that the President must faithfully execute. Since "a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law," 16 the President's duty of faithful execution does not extend to an unconstitutional statute.
Marshall buttresses his argument for judicial review by
noting that a judge takes an oath to support the Constitution.

II. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For arguments analogizing presidential review to
judicial review, see Easterbrook, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 919-20 (cited in note 7); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 Georgetown LJ. 217,244-45,257-62 (1994); Gary Lawson and Christopher D.
Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1306
(1996).
12. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
13. ld. at 176.
14. ld. at 177.
IS. U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 3 (emphasis added).
16. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
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This oath certainly applies, in an especial manner, to Uudges']
conduct in their official character. How immoral to impose it
on them, if they were to be used as the instruments, and the
knowing
instruments, for violating what they swear to supt?
port!

The same considerations would seem no less applicable to the
President, who takes an oath to "preserve, protect and defend
the Constitution of the United States." 18 According to advocates
of presidential review, it would be equally immoral-and no less
anomalous- to require a President who swears to "preserve,
protect and defend the Constitution" 19 to execute an unconstitutional statute. 20
II
In rejecting a presidential review power, May draws upon a
history of conflict between the English Crown and Parliament
prior to the founding of this country. Over the centuries, British
monarchs asserted a prerogative power to "suspend" a statuteinterrupting its legal effect-or to grant "dispensations," which
permitted designated persons to ignore the law. The courts upheld such assertions of executive power, concluding that Parliament lacked authority to restrict the royal prerogative.21
The dispute over these royal prerogatives reached a crisis
when King James II began granting dispensations and suspen17.
18.
19.

ld. at 180.
U.S. Const., Art. II,§ 1, cl. 8.
ld.
In response to the argument based on the Oath Oause, May quotes David

20.
Strauss:
It is perfectly plausible to say that the Constitution sometimes requires the
president to enforce a law that he considers, on balance, to be unconstitutional.
If that is what the Constitution requires, then the oath requires the president to
enforce the law-not to defy the law in pursuit of his own interpretation of the
Constitution.
(p. 17) (quoting David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 113, 121-22 (1993)). Of course, a similar response could be made to Chief
Justice Marshall's argument in Marbury. If we read the Constitution as requiring judges
to apply even laws they deem unconstitutional, then to do so would not violate the
judge's oath. Marshall, however, saw no room for this accommodation, at least with respect to the judicial oath. Perhaps one could distinguish the executive from the judiciary
based on the Take Care Oause (pp. 16-18), but it is not clear why the presidential oath
should be treated as fundamentally different from the oath taken by judges.
21. See, e.g., Godden v. Hales, 89 Eng. Rep. 1050, 1051 (K.B. 1686) (the court concluded "that the Kings of England were absolute Sovereigns; that the laws were the
King's laws; that the King had a power to dispense with any of the laws of Government
as he saw necessity for it; that he was sole judge of that necessity; that no Act of Parliament could take away that power").

1999]

BOOK REVIEWS

423

sions of legislation directed against Catholics and Protestant dissenters. The result was the abdication of James II, the coronation of William and Mary and the promulgation of the English
Bill of Rights. 22 (pp. 3-8) Accusing James and his "evil counsellors, judges, and ministers" of an attempt to "subvert and extirpate the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of this
kingdom," the English Bill of Rights abolished the suspending
power and limited the di~nsing power to situations where it
was authorized by statute.
This English restriction of the royal prerogative, according
to May, makes it improbable that the Framers intended to create
a presidential review power. He outlines the argument in the
first paragraph of chapter 1:
When the president refuses to honor a law on the ground that
it is unconstitutional, he exercises a power indistinguishable
from the royal suspending and dispensing powers-two of the
most formidable prerogative powers once wielded by the
British Crown. From the Middle Ages through the late seventeenth century, the kings and queens of England routinely
suspended or dispensed with laws, often on the ground that a
law was unconstitutional. After centuries of struggle between
the Crown and Parliament, the suspending and dispensing
powers were forever stripped from the English Crown by the
Bill of Rights of 1689. In the United States, however, as the
twentieth century draws to a close, presidents have increasingly claimed that they now possess the virtually identical
power to ignore allegedly unconstitutional laws. (p. 3)

May contends that the Constitution grants no explicit power of
presidential review and should not be read to create an implied
executive power that was denied the British monarch. Therefore, argues May, the President has no power to refuse enforcement of the laws, even if he believes them to be unconstitutional.
(pp.ll, 21)
The flaw in May's argument lies in the premise that the
royal suspending and dispensing prerogatives are "indistinguish-

22. George Burton Adams, Constitutional History of England 351-61 (J. Cape,
1948). See generally Carolyn A. Edie, Revolution and the Rule of Law: The End of the
Dispensing Power, 1689, 10 Eighteenth Century Stud. 434 (lm); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr.
and Matthew Kramer, The Glorious Revolution of 1688 (visited Feb. 12, 1999)
<http://www.lawsch.uga.edu/-gloriousl>. I would like to thank my colleague, Donald E.
Wilk~s, Jr., for lending me his collected research materials on the suspending and dispensmg powers.
23. 1 W & M, Sess. II, ch. 2 (1689).
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able" from or "virtually identical" to a power of presidential review.24 The English suspending and dispensing prerogatives
were general powers that could be exercised as the monarch saw
fit in the name of the public good. 25 As one defender of these
prerogatives argued, "there must be some Power always in being, to Suspend, or Dispense with such Law, or Laws, as PublickGood, the Safety of the People, or emergent Necessity require."u,
Thus, the suspending and dispensing prerogatives gave the
Crown broad power to supersede policy judgments of Parliament on policy grounds. By contrast, defenders of presidential
review make no claim that the President may ignore a statute
because of a difference of opinion with the legislature. Rather
the President must honor a congressional enactment unless it
contains an identifiable constitutional violation. The theoretical
justification for presidential review limits its application to instances where Congress purports to exercise authority it does
not possess. Thus, even if we reject (as we surely should) a
sweeping presidential power to suspend or dispense with laws on
policy grounds, it does not follow that we must reject the very
different and far narrower power to refuse execution of unconstitutional statutes.
To prove the point, we need only revisit our analogy to judicial review. The Founders did not intend the federal courts to
exercise a general power of suspending or dispensing with statutes for reasons of policy. 27 Nevertheless, assuming Marbury is
rightly decided, the Founders did intend the courts to exercise
the lesser power of judicial review. We thus may agree with May

24. See Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1306 (cited in note 11) (critiquing an
earlier version of May's work by distinguishing a general power of suspension from a
presidential review power limited to unconstitutional statutes).
25. There were certain exceptions to the suspending and dispensing powers. For
instance, the monarch could not dispense with a prohibition against an act malum in se.
(p. 6); Sir Matthew Hale, The Prerogatives of the King 178 (D.E.C. Yale, ed., Selden Society, 1976); Richard Langhorne, Considerations Touching the Great Question of the
King's Right in Dispensing with the Penal Laws 1 (Garland Publishing, Inc., 1976); Joseph
Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown; and the Relative Duties
and Rights of the Subject 95-96 (J. Butterworth and Son, 1820). But such exceptions in no
way altered the basic character of the suspending and dispensing powers, which, when
they were applicable, afforded the Crown a general authority to disregard laws as a matter of discretionary judgment.
26. Langhorne, Considerations Touching the Great Question of the King's Right in
Dispensing with the Penal Laws at 3 (cited in note 25) (emphasis added).
27. Alexander Hamilton anticipated that the judiciary would "take no active resolution whatever" in the creation of policy, exercising "neither force nor will but merely
judgment." Federalist 78 (Hamilton) in Wilmoore Kendall and George W. Carey, eds.,
The Federalist 464 (Arlington House, 1966).
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that the Framers denied the President a general power to suspend or dispense with statutes on policy grounds, without accepting his conclusion that they thereby foreclosed a Marburylike power of presidential review.
In any event, while May is surely correct that the relationship between the Crown and Parliament influenced the Framers'
deliberations regarding the powers of the President, we must
guard against too readily transplanting the rules of one constitutional system into the other. The United States Constitution, after all, departs in significant respects from the British model.
One critical difference is that the unwritten British constitution
rests upon a principle of "Parliamentary sovereignty," under
which no one may review a properly-enacted statute. As explained by a standard treatise on English Constitutional Law:
The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither
more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament [defined as
"the Queen, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons ... acting together"] has, under the English constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is recognised by the law of
England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament. 28

Under this principle, no one may invalidate an act of Parliament
because every person in England occupies a position inferior to
Parliament in the constitutional hierarchy. There is no power of
executive review in England for precisely the same reason that,
in that nation, there is no power of judicial review. In our system, by contrast, judicial review is a vigorous institution. This
fact alone casts a shadow over the historical and analogical argument based on English practice.
The deeper point is that the American Constitution reflects
a fundamentally different political philosophy than its English
forerunner. The United States Constitution implements a principle of popular, rather than parliamentary sovereignty. In this
country, neither Congress nor any other collection of government officials is sovereign. "We the people" are. The institution
of presidential review, like the institution of judicial review,
flows from this principle of popular sovereignty. When the
courts refuse to apply an unconstitutional statute, they are

28. A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 39-40
(Macmillan, lOth ed. 1959).
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merely honoring the constitutional directives of the sovereign
people. It is for this reason, as Hamilton explains in Federalist
No. 78, that recognition of a judicial review power does not
"suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power." 29
As he explains:
It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to
both, and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its
statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in
the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the lat30
ter rather than the former.

By the same token, the people hold sovereignty over the executive. For this reason, in carrying out his executive functions, the
President owes a higher allegiance to the will of the people expressed in the Constitution than to the will of Congress expressed in a statute. In short, the difference between the British
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty and the American principle of popular sovereignty provides a powerful theoretical justification for recognizing a presidential review authority under our
constitutional structure.

III
May's argument from English history is supplemented by inferences from the drafting and ratification of the United States
Constitution. His strongest argument rests on the Framers' conception of the President's veto power. The Framers viewed the
veto as the primary shield that protected the President against
constitutional encroachments by Congress. (p. 13) Nevertheless,
they rejected James Wilson's proposal for an absolute veto, unmoved by his argument that "without such a Self-defence the
Legislature can at any moment sink [the Executive] into
non-existence." 31 (p. 13)
Although the Framers intended the veto to protect against
unconstitutional acts of the legislature, they purposely qualified
the veto power. The constitutional override mechanism permits
Congress, by a two-thirds vote in each house, to reject any constitutional argument supporting a presidential veto.32 May ar29. Federalist 78 at 468 (cited in note 27).
30. ld. at 467-68.
31. Quoting 1 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 98
(1966).
32. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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gues that recognition of a presidential review power would effectively give the President an absolute veto over acts deemed unconstitutional, despite the Framers' rejection of an absolute veto
power. (pp. 11-15)
May's veto-power argument runs into much the same problem that undermined his argument based on the royal prerogative. The historical materials establish nothing more than a decision by the Framers to reject an absolute presidential veto
applicable to all legislation. Yet presidential review authority is
significantly less intrusive on lawmaking powers than such an absolute veto. Gary Lawson and Christopher Moore, responding
to an earlier version of May's work, suggest two bases on which
an absolute veto can be distinguished from a presidential review
power. 33 First, the President may only ignore laws that he in
good faith believes to be unconstitutional. An absolute veto
would permit the President to negate legislation for any reason
whatever. 34 Second, if a President ignores a statute, believing it
to be unconstitutional, it remains on the books and might be enforced upon election of a subsequent President with differing
constitutional views. An absolute veto would deny the legislation any possible future effect. To these arguments we may add
a third significant difference between presidential review and an
absolute veto. The President may only exercise a veto power
with respect to a complete bill. Presidential review permits the
President to act more surgically, ignoring only particular provisions of a statute that violate the Constitution while otherwise
implementing the legislation. Since an absolute veto is a much
greater intrusion on the lawmaking power than a presidential review power, the Framers' rejection of the former does not imply
rejection of the latter. 35
33. Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1306 (cited in note 11).
34. While the Framers viewed the veto as an important protection against unconstitutional legislation, this is not its only purpose. It can also be exercised on policy
grounds. As Hamilton explained, the President's veto serves "to guard the community
against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public
good, which may happen to influence a majority" of Congress. Federalist 73 at 443 (cited
in note 27).
35. Indeed, it could be that one basis for rejecting an absolute veto was the expectation that the President would ignore statutes encroaching on his constitutional authority,
though I am aware of no direct evidence to support this view. The availability of a presidential review power answers the concern expressed by James Wilson that Congress
could "at any moment sink (the Executive] into non-existence." See supra text accompanying note 31. Wilson subsequently gave a speech in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention indicating that the proposed Constitution would include a presidential review
power, permitting the President to "shield himself' from unconstitutional statutes.
Merrill Jensen, ed., 2 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 450-52
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May's search for the Framers' views on presidential review
is hindered by the paucity of discussion of the issue in the
founding generation. The only direct evidence-contained in a
speech by James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention-cuts against May's position. As Wilson, a member of the
Constitutional Convention and later a Justice of the Supreme
Court, explained:
[T]he legislature, when acting in that capacity, may transgress
the bounds assigned to it, and an act may pass, in the usual
mode, notwithstanding that transgression; but when it comes
to be discussed before the judges-when they consider its
principles and find it to be incompatible with the superior
power of the Constitution, it is their duty to pronounce it
void. . . . In the same manner, the President of the United
States could shield himself and refuse to carry into effect an act
36
that violates the Constitution.

May dismisses Wilson's comments as "a voice in the wilderness."37 (p. 27) This characterization appears, ironically, in the
course of an argument that the absence of a presidential review
power should be inferred from "the silence of the AntiFederalists," a silence "overwhelming in its implications." (pp.
26-29) (emphasis added) Because the Anti-Federalists sought to
portray the President as an elected monarch, May reasons, they
would have seized on any credible argument for presidential review as a reason to oppose the Constitution. 38 (p. 28) But even a
solitary statement by James Wilson, one of the constitutional
Framers, seems a stronger basis for drawing inferences about the
meaning of the document than the silence of the Constitution's
opponents. Wilson's parallel advocacy of judicial review and
presidential review offers contemporaneous evidence that such
an executive power comports with the work of the Framers.

(Worzalla Publishing Co., 1976); see infra text accompanying note 36.
36. Jensen, ed., 2 Documentary History of the Ratificalion of the Constitution at 45052 (cited in note 35) (emphasis added).
37. Of course, the original "voice in the wilderness" -John the Baptist-may have
been lonely, but he was also right, according to the New Testament accounts. See, e.g.,
Matthew 3:1-3, 11:11-14.
38. May cites no evidence that the Anti-Federalists offered such an argument in the
Pennsylvania Convention, after James Wilson made his explicit case for presidential review.
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IV
Assuming May is correct that a president must obey an unconstitutional statute, the surprise villain of May's book is President Jimmy Carter. In the chapters of the book devoted to
presidential practice, May documents 145 instances between
1789 and 1981 in which a president objected to legislation on
constitutional grounds. (pp. 127-31) He concludes that the
president actually refused to comply with the law in only 20
cases. (p. 127) Of these 20 acts of presidential defiance, seven of
them-over a third of the total-occurred during the four years
of Carter's presidency.39
In all probability, however, Carter takes top honors for
presidential defiance only because 1981 was the terminal date
for May's detailed research. For the years 1981-97, May collected data on the number of presidential signing statements
raising constitutional objections to legislation, but he did not investigate the subsequent course of conduct in those years to see
whether the president had complied with the challenged statute.
May's figures on constitutionally-qualified signing statements
suggest that Carter was probably outdistanced by both Presidents Reagan and Bush in the category of presidential defiance.
Carter averaged 7.5 constitutionally-qualified signing statements
in each year of his presidency, compared with 10.9 annually for
Reagan and 29 annually for Bush.40 (p. 74) If there is any connection between a president's constitutional rhetoric and his
conduct in office, it seems likely that Reagan and Bush ignored
statutory provisions on constitutional grounds even more frequently than Carter.
One conclusion May draws from his research into presidential practice is that no president defied a statute on constitutional

39. By May's reckoning, the Carter administration refused on constitutional
grounds to honor (1) a statute interfering with Carter's pardon of Vietnam draft resisters
(pardon power), (2) a ban on editorials by public broadcasters (freedom of speech), (3) a
statute requiring restoration of certain San Antonio missions (Establishment Qause), (4)
the War Powers Resolution (Commander-in-Chief powers), (5) a statute forbidding the
closing of certain consulates abroad (power to appoint consuls), (6) a statutorilyauthorized two-house veto of HEW regulations (presentment), and (7) a statute concerning the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (Appointments Oause). May,
Presidential Defiance of" Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative at 11115, 124-25, 129 (cited in note 5).
40. Over the course of his first term, President Ointon matched Carter's average of
7.5 constitutionally-qualified signing statements per year. (p. 74) It would be interesting
to see whether Ointon's constitutional objections increased after the election of a Republican majority to Congress in 1994.
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grounds until 1860. The first such offender, according to May,
was James Buchanan, who ignored a statute requiring assignment of Captain Montgomery Meigs to supervise construction of
a Washington, D.C. aqueduct (violating the President's Commander-in-Chief powers). (pp. 101-02, 127) May characterizes
the practice of presidential defiance as a recent phenomenon.
(pp. 101, 127-30)
May, however, can make this argument only by adopting a
minimalist view of what counts as presidential "defiance." By
May's criteria, for instance, President Thomas Jefferson did not
"defy" the Sedition Act when he refused to enforce it. After assuming the office of President, Jefferson pardoned persons convicted of sedition and dismissed the pending sedition prosecution
of William Duane, even though Duane's prosecution had been
initiated at the request of the Senate.41
These acts were motivated entire~ by Jefferson's view that
the sedition law was unconstitutional. Jefferson explained his
conduct in a letter to Abigail Adams (whose husband had been
the target of allegedly seditious publications):
I discharged every person under punishment or prosecution
under the sedition law, because I considered, and now consider, that law to be a nullity, as absolute and as palpable as if
Congress had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden
image; and that it was as much my duty to arrest its execution
in every stage, as it would have been to have rescued from the
fiery furnace those who should have been cast into it for refusing to worship the image. It was accordingly done in every
instance, without asking what the offenders had done, or
against whom they had offended, but whether the pains they
were suffering were inflicted under the pretended sedition
43
law.

An exercise of the pardon power does not necessarily
"defy" the law under which the recipient of the pardon was convicted. Nor does an exercise of prosecutorial discretion necessarily amount to "defiance" of congressional authority. But
here, the pardons and the withdrawal of charges under the Sedi41. James Morton Smith, Freedom's Feners: The Alien and Sedition Laws and
American Civil Liberties 301,305 (Cornell U. Press, 1956).
42. Id. at 305. Indeed, Jefferson instructed the prosecutor to determine whether
any other law could form the basis for prosecution. ld.
43. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (July 22, 1804), reprinted in
Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, eds., 11 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 42, 43-44 (Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904).
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tion Act were explicitly based on Jefferson's decision to treat the
statute as a legal nullity. This was a deliberate refusal to execute
a law passed by Congress. While these acts by Jefferson were
probably unreviewable, that does not resolve the question of
whether he complied with his constitutional duty to faithfully
execute the laws. It is difficult to argue that Jefferson did so unless one acknowledges that a president may properly refuse to
execute an unconstitutional statute. Jefferson's conduct presents
a clear, early assertion of a presidential review power and counters May's conclusion that presidential review is a recent innovation.44

v
If a President may ignore an unconstitutional statute, may
he also ignore a Supreme Court decision that misinterprets the
Constitution or exceeds the Court's authority? Most advocates
of presidential review have declined to push the theory this far,
acknowledging some form of judicial supremacy, particularly in
the context of Article III cases and controversies. As a practical matter, then, the legitimacy of presidential review is an issue
that will probably be resolved (if at all) in court. If the Supreme
Court ever rejected the presidential review power, the President
would likely acquiesce. On the other hand, if the Court sided
44. May discusses the pardons issued by Jefferson, but does not address Jefferson's
refusal to prosecute under the sedition law. (pp. 22-23, 39)
45. Easterbrook, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. at 926 (cited in note 7); Legal Opinion, 48
Ark. L. Rev. at 315 (cited in note 9) (suggesting president should comply with a statute
he believes the Supreme Court would view as constitutional, notwithstanding his own
beliefs to the contrary). On the other hand, Michael Paulsen has argued that the President may act upon his constitutional principles, even to the extent of refusing to carry out
a contrary court judgment. Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L.J. at 276-84 (cited in note 11).
Paulsen's rejection of judicial supremacy echoes the position of Thomas Jefferson in another letter to Abigail Adams:
You seem to think it devolved on the judges to decide on the validity of the
sedition law. But nothing in the Constitution has given them a right to decide
for the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for them. Both magistrates are equally independent in the sphere of action assigned to them. The
judges, believing the law constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence of fine
and imprisonment; because the power was placed in their hands by the Constitution. But the executive, believing the Jaw to be unconstitutional, were bound
to remit the execution of it; because that power has been confided to them in
the Constitution. That instrument meant that its co-ordinate branches should
be checks on each other. But the opinion which gives to the judges the right to
decide what laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in
their own sphere of action, but for the legislature and executive also, in their
spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), reprinted in Lipscomb
and Bergh, eds., 11 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 49, 50-51 (cited in note 43).
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with the President on the existence of such a power, the debate
could 46be expected to shift from its legitimacy to its appropriate
scope.
Professor May's work previews some of the arguments and
evidence likely to play a role if that future court test ever comes
to pass. While I was not persuaded by Professor May's analysis,
Presidential Defiance is a book that merits serious attention by
those interested in the current debate over presidential review
authority.

46. Four Supreme Court Justices signed onto a concurring opinion recognizing the
existence of a presidential review power. Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Reve'!ue,
501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). In an earlier case, a panel of the N1~th
Circuit rejected the existence of a presidential review power, but the en bane court Withdrew and replaced that portion of the panel opinion. Lear Siegler, Inc., Energy Prods.
Div'n v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1121-26 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn and replaced in part
en bane, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Ameron, Inc., v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1'irl F.2d 'ir75 (3d Cir.), modified, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986). In an alternative scenario, the decisive test of presidential review power could arise in an impeachment proceeding.

